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A Kantian Hybrid Theory of Art Criticism: A Particularist Appeal to the Generalists

ABSTRACT

Noël Carroll proposes a generalist theory of art criticism, which essentially involves evaluations of artworks on the basis of their success value, at the cost of rendering evaluations of reception value irrelevant to criticism. In this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, which incorporates Carroll’s objective model but puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of reception value. I argue that this hybrid model is supported by Kant’s theory of taste. Hence, I not only present an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also show that, contrary to a common conception, Kant’s aesthetic theory can house a fruitful account of art criticism. The benefit of this hybrid account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll.

1. INTRODUCTION

Noël Carroll (2009, 3) states that his aim in writing On Criticism is to reconstruct art criticism so as to render it objective. He presents a plausible generalist account of objective art criticism that is essentially evaluation supported by good reasons. However, this approach comes at a price: art criticism no longer involves exercising one’s taste, and thereby a good art critic does not need to have taste. For Carroll, reasoned evaluation consists in informing readers as to what is of value and disvalue in an artwork and why (2009, 50). What is of value in an artwork, Carroll argues, is its success value, which is defined as the achievement or the failure of the artist (2009, 52). Hence, the function of art criticism becomes that of telling others whether or not the artwork under scrutiny is an achievement or a failure and, furthermore, specifying why it is an achievement or why it is a failure. What drops out of this picture of art criticism is the reception value of the work. Carroll’s art critic does not evaluate the effects of artworks. What is valuable in an artwork has nothing to do with the positive aesthetic experiences the work affords to its audience. Assigning success value is merely a matter of determining whether the work is a good instance of its kind; this determination, Carroll argues, is objective and taste-free (2009, 9 and 180). For instance, an evaluation of Joan Mitchell’s Hemlock on the basis of interpreting it as opening up new directions for abstract expressionism does not require taste, just as an evaluation of a vacuum cleaner with respect to its capacity to clean carpets would not require taste.

I agree with Carroll that evaluation of success value does not require taste. However, I do not agree that the critic’s job is limited to evaluating a work’s success value. Critical evaluation should explore the reception value of the work in question. Therefore, in this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, one that incorporates Carroll’s objective model but puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of artworks with respect to their reception value. I propose that this hybrid model is supported by Kant’s theory of taste.

The grounds for the possibility of this integration lie in the centrality of good-of-its-kind judgments in both Kant’s and Carroll’s accounts.
I argue that the critical practices subsumed under the Kantian model partially involve the ones outlined by Carroll because these functions correlate with one of the judgments that are involved in judging artworks. This judgment is the judgment of perfection, and it involves reporting whether a work is good of its kind and thereby reporting the success value of the artwork. I suggest that the Kantian art critic uses good-of-its-kind judgments to narrow down the common ground of appreciation, which would otherwise be nonarticulable. In other words, determinations of success value become pivotal in approximating reception value of artworks. Hence, in this article I will not only be suggesting an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also making a case for Kantian art criticism. My construction of the Kantian hybrid account of art criticism demonstrates that, contrary to common conception, Kant’s theory can indeed yield a fruitful account of art criticism, one that might prove to be useful in reconstructing the enterprise of art criticism today. The benefit of this hybrid Kantian account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll.

II. ART CRITICISM AND SUCCESS VALUE

Throughout On Criticism, Carroll reduces the main critical question of what is of value in an artwork to the question of what success value and reducing this to the question of whether or not the artwork is a good example of its kind. The critic’s job is to determine the purpose of the work, which in turn supplies him or her with a set of expectations and then reporting whether or not the work meets these expectations (Carroll 2009, 93–94). If it meets these expectations, then it is marked as an achievement. If it does not, it is marked as a failure.

Classification—namely, determining the category membership of an artwork, that is, determining which artform, genre, subgenre, style, oeuvre, movement, lineage, tradition, and so on that the work belongs to—becomes the principal means for determining the purpose of a work. In fact, classification, while initially characterized at the beginning of On Criticism as one of the critical suboperations, gains a central place in reasoned evaluation as the book unfolds. Classification is not only the basis on which the critic assigns value but also is the main wherewithal for choosing which other suboperations of criticism, such as description, contextualization, elucidation, interpretation, and analysis, are appropriate to engage in, and what they should involve, in order to explain why an artwork has value and/or disvalue. To use Carroll’s own example (2009, 168–169), Joan Acocella’s criticism of Mark Morris’s Mozart Dances places the work in the category of modern dance abstraction, thereby identifying its problematic, which is to make abstract movement accessible. Mozart Dances gets a favorable evaluation because it meets this challenge. The success value of the work gets grounded in reasons, which are yet again formed and shaped by this classification. Acocella maintains that the Morris piece becomes accessible due to the underlying vague but discernible narrative running through the abstract movements. By describing, interpreting, and contextualizing, she allows the reader to see the narrative. For instance, she describes the repetitive sharp movements of the women dancers in the opening section, then the way the male soloist looks upward with his fisted hands against his chest in the second dance, and then from the final section she chooses to describe how some of the dancers hold their hands over their hearts while others hold out their arms in a questioning gesture. These descriptions are supplemented with corresponding interpretations of these movements to form the narrative: the first is interpreted as premonition of trouble, the second as a sign of desperation and abandonment, and the last as a nagging, even unsettling, state of irresolution. We see that the suboperations provide support to the evaluation of success value only insofar as they themselves receive support from sound and objective classifications. Objective criticism, that is, objective reasoned evaluation, becomes a possibility on the basis of objective classification.

Carroll identifies three main lines of thought that hinder the possibility of objective criticism, and he rejects them one by one: (1) criticism is an exercise in taste; hence it is highly personal and idiosyncratic; (2) there are no objective general principles governing the relation between nonaesthetic properties and aesthetic evaluations; hence the reasons the critic provides in the form of descriptive statements to support his or her evaluations are completely arbitrary; (3) criticism is
subjective because the process through which the critic chooses to classify an artwork is subjective.

Carroll argues that because critical taste has been theorized by analogy to gustatory or sensory taste and taken to be an internal capacity for experiencing beauty and/or artistic merit, art criticism is considered to be highly personal and idiosyncratic. In order to reject the claim that criticism is subjective, Carroll rejects that criticism is an exercise in taste. His initial move involves claiming that “beauty is too limited a concept to supply us with the critical vocabulary we need to estimate the value of artwork” (Carroll 2009, 160). He writes, “for much of the value critics discover in artworks has to do with the kind of intellectual achievements in the work that are hardly comprehensible on the model of our basic operating perceptual system” (161). After all, it seems impossible to say for works such as Goya’s *Saturn Devouring His Son* or *Wicked Woman* that they have artistic value because they are beautiful (160). Furthermore, according to Carroll we do not even experience aesthetic pleasure in contemplating such works. What we are or more precisely should be interested in are the intellectual achievements in the work; these intellectual achievements are tantamount to being good of a kind. It might look as though this argument at most establishes that only some type of criticism is objective since criticism of works deemed beautiful should still be concerned with determination of reception value, which necessarily involves taste and thereby invites the charge of subjectivism. So the type of criticism he supports is indeed completely objective—it is a type of criticism that is not an exercise in taste because it is a purely intellectual endeavor that consists in determining a work to be good of its kind.

Carroll’s second argument addresses one of the central dilemmas of metacriticism. The dilemma, formulated by Arnold Isenberg (1949), problematizes the relationship between aesthetic judgments or verdicts (V) (This film or painting is good) and reasons (R) (because it has such-and-such a quality). In particular, Isenberg is interested in descriptive statements concerning nonaesthetic features of artworks, and he asks whether they can support critical verdicts. The dilemma he sets up is this:

1. A description becomes critically relevant and useful only when it is backed up by a norm (N) or a general principle. Put otherwise, R can support V only if R is backed up by N, which states that any work which has the quality stated in R is *pro tanto* good.
2. In the absence of N, we must assume that R is perfectly arbitrary (Isenberg 1949, 355).

The obvious problem is that we cannot find such general norms that apply across all artforms and artworks. So, in the absence of general principles, are we supposed to accept that the critic’s reasons are arbitrary and criticism is subjective? Isenberg and other particularists found the solution in dismissing general principles while at the same time pointing out that this dilemma is actually a false dilemma. Consequently, the defeat of the generalist was complete: there are no general principles, but even if there were, rational inferences from these principles would not provide a logical argument to persuade the readers of the reception value of an artwork. Isenberg’s point was simple: if I have not experienced the work myself, there is no possibility for me to be able to experience aesthetic pleasure through reading a criticism of the artwork even if the critic magically backs up his or her descriptions with general principles (1949, 339).

Carroll accepts Isenberg’s main points against generalism. However, in the spirit of reviving generalism from its ashes, he develops an alternative solution and argues as follows:

1. There are no general principles a critic can appeal to in making rational inferences as to the reception value or success value of an artwork.
2. There are, however, general-enough *pro tanto* principles that critics use in grounding their assessments of the success value of artworks (Carroll 2009, 166–167).

The general-enough principles are “about what counts as success in the pertinent artforms, genres, and so forth . . . [and] are sufficient to ground . . . [the critics’] evaluations” (Carroll 2009, 167–168). Critics get access to them “by adverting to categories of art and their purposes” (Carroll 2009, 167). In this sense, they are category relative. For instance, Acocella grounds her criticism of *Mozart Dances* in the general-enough principle that a suggested narrative is a good-making
feature. However, it is not a good-making feature for all artworks per se, but rather only for modern abstract choreography. Hence, even finding general-enough principles depends on classification of artworks and the purported purposes assigned to them in relation to their category membership. Acocella’s criticism is grounded in this general-enough principle because initially she classifies Mozart Dances as a modern dance abstraction, which then allows her to identify the purposes and expectations attached to this category, namely, to solve the problematic of making abstract movement accessible. Carroll states that this principle is a pro tanto principle because it admits that in some cases either a suggested narrative could be regarded not as a positive feature of the work or the work could lack the suggested narrative because it solves the problematic in virtue of some other feature (2009, 169).

Carroll tackles the final obstruction to the vindication of objective criticism by demonstrating how classification can be objective. He argues that there are three objective reasons that support critics’ classifications, namely, structural, historical-contextual, and intentional reasons (Carroll 2009, 172). For instance, if the artwork has salient features that are standard to a category, the critic has strong structural reasons to classify it under that category. Furthermore, the critic’s determination of the category membership of a work more often than not is informed by art-historical context. Situating the work in its institutional or cultural context supports the classifications the critic makes. For instance, classifying a tribal artwork under the category of primitivism just because it has features that are standard to primitivism is disregarding the historico-contextual reasons and confusing the order of influence. Lastly, we have objective means other than classification to indirectly access the artist’s intentions (Carroll 2009, 76). Therefore, the structural, contextual, and intentional considerations, particularly when combined together, provide an objective basis on which to ground classification and render it objective.

These three arguments, as I have illustrated, show that a certain kind of art criticism, namely, reasoned evaluation, is an objective enterprise. Carroll establishes this objectivity at the expense of rendering taste irrelevant to criticism. As Carroll mentions at one point, the critic judges whether the artwork is good of its kind as one judges a steak knife to be good of its kind (2009, 179). The processes are similar; they involve classifying, finding a purpose, setting up expectations, telling whether the object meets these expectations, and then finally pronouncing whether it is a good example of its kind. The critic’s processes do not involve exercising taste or making aesthetic judgments about the work he or she is criticizing.

III. ART CRITICISM AND RECEPTION VALUE

Now I turn to the main topic at hand, namely, delineating a hybrid account of art criticism that is essentially particularist while accommodating Carroll’s generalist model. The hybrid account is endorsed by the Kantian theory of taste. As a forerunner of aesthetic particularism, Kant formulated its principle tenets in his own peculiar way in the Critique of the Power of Judgment: There are two key features shared by all particularist accounts, and these features, unless supplemented by some other premise, seem to undercut the possibility of art criticism: rejection of aesthetic testimony and rejection of general principles of reception value. If art criticism is an enterprise of providing evaluations of artworks supported by reasons, then it is hard to see what the Kantian art critic can do for us. First, Kant says that we cannot defer to the critic’s aesthetic judgment, so it is hard to see whether it matters at all that an art critic communicates to us his or her evaluation of an artwork on the basis of its reception value. Second, as Isenberg states, it is not clear whether it matters at all that the critic provides reasons in the form of descriptive statements if these reasons are completely arbitrary given the absence of general objective principles governing the relation between nonaesthetic properties and aesthetic evaluations.

It is standardly assumed that Kant’s theory does not provide any supplementary theoretical leeway to suppress these worries, and hence a theory of criticism flies in the face of Kant’s rejection of aesthetic testimony and of general principles (see Crawford 1974, 160–171; Wollheim 1980, 194). This is the reading I challenge by showing that Kant introduced a mediating process between aesthetic evaluations of reception value of artworks and reasons provided in the form of descriptive statements. I argue that this mediating process is nothing other than the evaluation of success value. The possibility of Kantian art criticism lies in the
fact that the Kantian framework provides a particularist model that incorporates generalist elements. I turn to Kant instead of other particularists to create a hybrid account of art criticism because the hybrid theory is already implied by his theory of aesthetic properties, which obviates any need for an artificial construction of a hybrid theory, such as by means of merging Carroll’s account with some other particularist account. Furthermore, other particularist positions are not hospitable to such incorporation. On the basis of the present literature there are two main schools of particularism. The first one is the realist solution. In order to avoid the problem concerning the arbitrariness of reasons, Isenberg (1949) and Sibley (1959), more discreetly, and Mothersill (1961, 1984), more conspicuously, endorsed that aesthetic properties are real and perceptual. Descriptive statements have an ostensive function and serve as a guide to perceiving aesthetic qualities of the object, which depend on nonaesthetic properties without being reducible to them. The second solution, which is proposed by Goldman (1990), embraces antirealism. Similar to the realists, Goldman also accepts that aesthetic properties supervene on but are irreducible to nonaesthetic properties. Different from them, he argues that aesthetic properties consist not only in phenomenal properties, but also in relations among them, which are not always perceivable. The critic can nevertheless use descriptive statements to trace the relations into which phenomenal properties enter and the manner in which they are altered to give a general picture of where an artwork’s aesthetic value lies. However, the type of relations that alter the phenomenal properties can be various and can affect different judges in different ways depending on their personal taste and preferences. As a result, Goldman’s account seems to provide a solution at the expense of endorsing radical, irresolvable aesthetic disagreements.

Whether realist or antirealist in perspective, these theorists introduce aesthetic properties as mediators; hence the incorporation of Carroll’s account would amount to an unnecessary addition of a theory of success value to an already metaphysically packed framework. More to the point, concocting a hybrid by the brute addition of a Carroll-style success-value-based generalist account to a particularist model of art appreciation would be ad hoc. For one thing, the merger would not be internally motivated from either the particularist or the generalist theoretical standpoint. Such a hybrid would hence bear at a minimum the following further explanatory burdens. From the generalist angle, one would have to explain why the metaphysically loaded commitment to aesthetic properties is needed given that parsimony considerations cut the other way. From the particularist angle, success value would have to earn its keep. Kant’s theory of taste presents a framework that can incorporate Carroll’s account with ease, without incurring further theoretical commitments. In this section, I will closely follow Kant and what he has to say about how we judge artworks and thereby derive implications for art criticism.

Let us first see how the Kantian account can incorporate Carroll’s model. I argue that the critical practices subsumed under the Kantian model partially involve the ones outlined by Carroll because these functions correlate with one of the judgments Kant identifies as involved in judging artworks. This judgment is that of perfection, and it involves reporting whether a work is good of its kind. This is, for Carroll, the basis of the critic’s evaluation. Kant describes the judgment of perfection as presupposing a concept of what the object ought to be (KU 5:227, §15). In the case of art, this concept can be one of the critical categories, such as the specific art form, genre, movement, tradition, style, and so on. This judgment expresses the degree of agreement of the thing with this presupposed concept. In accordance with this concept an objective purpose is assigned to the object, and we judge whether the object has what it takes to be that kind of an object with that specific purpose.

There are two things to note here. First, this judgment involves comparing the representation by which an object is given to us with other representations associated with the same kind concept. Put otherwise, using Carroll’s (2009, 166–168) example, the judgment “Harold Lloyd’s Safety Last is a good example of slapstick comedy” involves comparing our representation of Safety Last with what a slapstick comedy ought to be. The rule or the general-enough pro tanto principle provided by slapstick comedy, namely, “slapstick comedies contain many successful pratfalls,” regulates our judgment. Given that Safety Last contains many successful pratfalls, all else being equal, it is a good example of a slapstick comedy. Second, it should not be assumed that there is only one fixed kind concept we can appeal to in making a judgment.
of perfection about an object. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant writes, “one thing can have several qualitative perfections” (MS, 6:386). This indicates that there are several different objective purposes that can be assigned to the same object. For instance, we can assign different purposes to Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s *Once Upon a Time in Anatolia* in accordance with the kind concept or the category we place it under, such as crime-thriller, drama, slow-cinema, neorealism, and so on.

This description of judgments of perfection obviously jibes with Carroll’s good-of-its-kind judgments. Additionally, just as for Carroll, they do not involve exercising taste. Kant clearly states that “[i]n general, therefore, the concept of perfection as objective purposiveness has nothing at all to do with the feeling of pleasure” (KU 20:228, VII). This statement should be assessed within its context. Here the feeling of pleasure denotes aesthetic pleasure exclusively. Hence, Kant’s statement does not rule out that there is an element of pleasure involved in making judgments of perfection, namely, intellectual pleasure. However, there is a twist: for Kant evaluations of artworks are not based solely on judgments of perfection since aesthetic judgments express our evaluations of the reception value of artworks. Having said this, the function of judgments of perfection in forming informed impure judgments of taste has been addressed in the secondary literature (see Guyer 2005; Zuckert 2007; Rueger 2008; Wicks 1997; Mallaband 2002). It is widely assumed that Kant’s descriptions of judgments of artistic beauty and judgments of adherent beauty correlate since both require the presupposition of a concept of what the object ought to be and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. Hence the former should be impure just like the latter. There are various ways in which these impure judgments can be formed depending on the object. They can result from combinations of judgments of perfection and judgments of taste (as depicted by the conjunctive view) or incorporation of the former in the latter (as portrayed by the incorporation view). In all these instances, the judgment of perfection that is either combined with or integrated into the judgment of taste expresses the degree to which the work meets our expectations. There are two main judgments available for judging artistic beauty as adherent beauty. The first involves the incorporation of a positive judgment of perfection into a judgment of taste. In this instance, the positive good-of-its-kind judgment directly contributes to the reception value of an artwork. The second leads to a nullification of a positive judgment of taste or can be used to explain a work’s failure to evoke one due to a negative judgment of perfection.

Carroll’s account of judgments of success value, with some additions from Kendall Walton’s theory of categories of art, would be fit to explain the specific role of judgments of perfection in this regard. Classifying an artwork under an appropriate category allows us to identify general enough *pro tanto* principles, but additionally these principles are intimately connected to the determination of standard and variable properties of the work in relation to its category membership. For instance, one of the main challenges for De Stijl paintings is to produce a nonrepresentational, yet nonetheless expressive, composition that consists of straight lines and rectangular grids in a two-dimensional space by using a color palette involving primary colors, black, and white. This *pro tanto* principle already sets up what properties can count as standard and as variable. To use the much quoted example from Ernst Hans Gombrich (1984, 296 ft.), judging whether Piet Mondrian’s *Broadway Boogie-Woogie* is a good example of De Stijl partially involves determining whether or not it carries the standard properties of this category, such as having a rectangular grid and using a restricted color palette, and recognizing its variable properties, such as having a colorful grid. Kant also tells us that in making a judgment of perfection we compare the object with other objects of the same kind (KU 5:232–235, §17). If our contrast class consists only of paintings classified under De Stijl, *Broadway Boogie-Woogie* strikes us as energetic, as if it is itself buzzing with sound. Most paintings in this category look serene, cold, or orderly. *Broadway Boogie-Woogie*, due to its colorful grid, starts to look energetic only in relation to what we compare it to. If our comparison class were the general class of abstract paintings, this assessment would not have been made since the grid, monochrome or colorful, is variable. However, this appearance of being energetic is not an aesthetic quality. Rather it is the impression it makes on us. From the Kantian perspective, these impressions are categorized under the concept of being energetic on the basis of the comparison we make. Indeed, Kant lists comparison or contrast as one of the causes that increase sense
impression (Anth, 7:162). Different from contradiction, which consists in the linking of mutually antagonistic concepts, contrast is the juxtaposition of mutually contrary sense representations under one and the same concept, in this case the concept of De Stijl (Kant, Anth, 7:162). As Gombrich puts it, in the case of Broadway Boogie-Woogie, “this impression is in fact grounded on our knowledge of the restricted choice open to the artist within his self-imposed discipline” (1984, 297). After this determination, a judgment of perfection can ensue: one can judge Broadway Boogie-Woogie to be a good example of its kind given that it meets the expectations one has from a neoplasticist painting, namely, an expressive, yet nonrepresentational, composition using a very restricted number of elements. However, this value judgment is not a reception value judgment but a success value judgment. This judgment informs our reception value judgment insofar as it directly tells us the relevant qualities of the painting we should attend to. We make a reception value judgment—a judgment of taste—by reflecting on the organization of the relevant properties of the painting, which are picked out with respect to the judgment of perfection, and how it presents the affect of being energetic. If we did not go through the steps of classification in nonaesthetic evaluation, we would not be able to form this aesthetic judgment. We would not be able even to pinpoint what the work presents. In this regard, the work’s success value contributes to its reception value.

On the conjunctive view, it is also possible for a work, which would have induced the free play of the cognitive faculties otherwise, not to do so once we place it under an appropriate category. For instance, one could find a piece of music beautiful until realizing that it is intended to be a sonata. Properties that are variable with respect to the category of music could be standard for the category of sonata. Hence, the lack of these properties, which would not have bothered us a bit, should count against the work after we have placed it under the relevant category. For instance, it can lack the typical transitions within movements and clear distinctions between movements, such that it can be devoid of an appropriate development. Hence, within the restriction imposed by the category of sonata, we can no longer judge the work to be beautiful. In Kantian terms, a positive judgment of taste is overridden by a negative judgment of perfection. Put otherwise, a judgment of reception value is overridden by a negative judgment of success value. We can then either greet the work with indifference or we can find it unpleasant. There will also be scenarios in which a musical piece does not initially trigger any aesthetic engagement, or might in fact elicit displeasure. The explanation for this initial response can be given again by appealing to a negative judgment of perfection.

As these examples illustrate, the judgment of perfection is about checking whether or not an artwork meets the expectations attached to the categories under which we subsume it. This process informs one’s positive or negative assessments of reception value of an artwork. What is more noteworthy, I think, is what happens in the cases of artworks that exceed our expectations. The idea of radically new artworks is not successfully handled in Carroll’s account. Carroll (2009, 94–96) talks about artworks that do not seem to fit under preexisting categories or that belong to nascent artforms. He argues that even in these cases classification is still possible. Even if we suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is an artwork that is radically new, no one would be able to understand such a work and acknowledge that it is art (Carroll 2009, 95). Furthermore, he argues that artworks that are aimed to bring about a perceptual revolution in art fit under the tradition of the new, which encompasses movements, such as Cubism, Dadaism, Pop Art, Minimalism, and so on (Carroll 2009, 95–96). To classify the new, critics create new categories by hybridization, category-splicing, and so forth. The new is always understood relationally. Sometimes it is a result of amplification, inventing new solutions to an earlier problematic, just as Jackson Pollock’s drip painting advanced the problematic of modern painting to a new level (Carroll 2009, 103). Sometimes it is a result of repudiation, just as impressionism developed out of rejection of academic and romantic art or as Jenny Saville rejected beauty-obsessed art by celebrating the sublate in her depictions of distorted, fleshy, and disquieting naked female bodies.15 All in all, according to Carroll, the critic is able to find a category and thereby a purpose to every work and set up expectations so that he or she can determine its artistic value in relation to the work’s success in meeting those expectations.

I see two main problems with Carroll’s position. The first is that classification of a transgressive work under the category of new or avant-garde cannot function in the specific capacity Carroll
wants it to, namely, to help the critic to set up general-enough _pro tanto_ principles to judge its success value. The category of avant-garde is too broad and vague. For instance, there is no _pro tanto_ principle that can be derived from the category of avant-garde prior to Duchamp’s ready-mades to specify expectations that Duchamp’s _Fountain_ is set to meet. Did we have the expectation that an artwork can be anaesthetic and ready-made prior to Duchamp? Did we presuppose that what is expressed by an artwork can be independent of what we see, hear, or watch? It is true that we make use of different categories, but it is not true that these categories help us to set up expectations. Instead they assist us to understand how the work under scrutiny exceeds our expectations. This connects to the second problem with Carroll’s account: These works do not meet expectations; they exceed our expectations. If they were to meet our expectations then the critic would be able to subsume these works under existing categories and determine their standard and variable properties and discern _pro tanto_ principles applicable to them accordingly. To use Walton’s account again, these works exhibit contra-standard properties that resist ordinary subsumption. In order to subsume these works the critic amplifies existing categories or creates new categories to subsume these works. Carroll suggests that the expectations are set in reference to these new or modified categories, and the critic’s evaluation consists in determining the success of these works in meeting these expectations. He seems to forget that the new expectations did not exist prior to the work itself. These works create new rules instead of conforming to old rules. Therefore, their merit lies in their respective success in exceeding expectations and setting up a new set of expectations attached to the new or amplified categories. Carroll does not seem to acknowledge this kind of value, which does not count as value under the judgment of perfection. However, Kant takes it to be central in understanding art appreciation. It is in these instances, I argue, that judgments of perfection play a crucial role in making informed judgments of taste that yield positive reception value.

Beautiful art, according to Kant, expresses aesthetic ideas that symbolically present rational ideas, empirical concepts, or emotions.² The aesthetic idea refers to the organization of the unity of diverse nonaesthetic internal properties, such as having an archaic, detailed, and linear style, diagonal axis, or sensual colors, alongside aesthetic attributes, namely, supplementary representations of imagination, such as depiction of a Sphinx as the attribute of moral temptation (see Allison 2001, 283). It constitutes the artwork itself. Aesthetic ideas are products of imagination that result from transforming what is given in experience into an idea without yielding to the laws of association (KU 5:314, §49). In creating them, the imagination is productive and hence creative. It both breaks with the laws of association and creates new associations. This freedom from the laws of association also makes it possible for aesthetic ideas (1) to “strive towards something lying beyond the bounds of experience, thus seek to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason,” such as “the ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc.” and (2) to present empirical concepts or emotions, that is, things “of which there are examples in experience, e.g. death, envy, and all sorts of vices, as well as love, fame, etc., beyond the limits of experience, with a completeness that goes beyond anything of which there is an example in nature” (KU 5:314, §49). An aesthetic idea is able to indirectly present a rational idea or an empirical concept because, when we reflect on the aesthetic idea, it directs us to reflect on the indeterminate or determinate concept that it aims to present. For instance, Gustave Moreau’s _Oedipus and the Sphinx_ presents the idea of the power of reason against temptation because there is a correspondence between the ways in which one reflects on the aesthetic idea expressed by the painting and on the rational idea. However, there is no guarantee that every organization of a multitude of properties presenting rational ideas, empirical concepts, or emotions will be regarded as beautiful. Depicting a sphinx in minute detail does not automatically make the work beautiful. In order to count as beautiful, the organization should also display both originality and exemplarity (KU 5:307f, §46). This having been said, we do not directly experience originality and exemplarity; they are not perceptual properties. Instead they are the means for judging beauty (Refl, 16:125).

Originality consists in breaking with existing rules, while exemplarity lies in creating a new rule. The originality of a work is determined in relation to other works. When we subsume an artwork under existing categories of art, these kind concepts single out the rules according to which
work is produced and should be judged. Indeed, Kant seems to think that “every art presupposes rules which first lay the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is first represented as possible” (KU 5:307, §46). However, genial works do not follow existing rules; instead they break them. Kant states that genius is “a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule, consequently that originality must be its primary characteristic” (KU 5: 307f, §46). In this sense, a work, insofar as it breaks with the existing rules, cannot be placed under existing categories, which endorse these rules. However, originality is not sufficient for making a work genial, for Kant asserts that “since there can also be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. exemplary, hence, while not themselves the result of imitation [Nachahmung], they must yet serve others in that way, i.e. as a standard or a rule for judging” (KU 5:308, §46). As Martin Gammon puts it, the exemplarity of a work, namely, whether or not it creates a new rule, can be determined in terms of its reception as an archetype (Urbild) for the emulation (Nachfolge) of future geniuses, as a pattern (Muster) for imitation (Nachahmung) of future artists, as model (Modell) or precept (Vorschrift) for the replication (Nachmachung) by schools, and as an expression of peculiarity (Eigenthümlichkeit), which may serve for the aping (Nachäufung) of counterfeits, plagiarists, and “tyros.” (1997, 588)

I take Kant’s claims about exemplary originality to denote a twofold approach to genial works. We do not judge the genial work only with respect to its antecedents or precedents (since otherwise we cannot determine its originality), but also with respect to its successors (since otherwise its exemplary influence cannot be articulated). This twofold characteristic of genial works, I argue, is grounded in their success in exceeding our expectations.

They exceed our expectations concerning aesthetic ideas due to the fact that, in creating them, genius not only breaks with the laws of association and the rules of aesthetic convention, but also establishes new associations and new conventions. This in turn opens up the possibility for a rational idea, an empirical concept, or an emotion to be presented in unexpected ways and leads to an aesthetic expansion of this presented material. Kant asserts that in judging such works as beautiful, the aesthetic idea gets added to the rational idea that it aims to present and “aesthetically enlarges the concept [of reason] itself in an unbounded way” (KU 5:315, §49). He says that this addition of the aesthetic idea corresponds to an addition of “that [which] is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language” to the rational idea (KU 5:316, §49). Hence, the expression of the aesthetic idea, which is the work itself, arouses certain feelings, which recall to the mind the feelings stemming from reflection on a rational idea. This rational idea turns out to be what the aesthetic idea aims to present. It also makes us realize that there are several other representations that arouse the same feelings in us, which can now be seen as different attributes of the same rational idea. Through these new associations the rational idea gets expanded and we find further pleasure in this expansion. It is this felt expansion that results in declaring the object beautiful.

One obvious question is how we determine that the work exceeds our expectations. I think that it can be done only indirectly. The main thing we need to keep in mind is that for Kant the new is always understood relationally, as it is for Carroll. In this sense we need to appeal to some categories in order to appreciate the way in which the work exceeds our expectations. The judgment of taste cannot, however, be the judgment by which we determine that a work exceeds our expectations. After all, the judgment of taste is not based on a determinate concept. At this point the judgment of perfection becomes central as a mediator. Our reflection on the given intuition (that is, the aesthetic idea) is occasioned or triggered by the relevant categories. Recall that the function of a judgment of perfection on the basis of objective classification is to directly single out the properties constitutive of the aesthetic idea expressed by the object. A judgment of perfection cannot function in such a capacity for judging original and exemplary works, which resist classification and are not good examples of any extant artistic kind. In these cases, the relevant categories, namely, the existing categories that will be amplified in order to subsume the work or the categories that are repudiated by the work, indirectly single out the contra-standard properties of
the work. These contra-standard properties, which will become standard with respect to the amplified category or the new category, are constitutive of the aesthetic idea expressed by the work. Hence, we determine whether or not the work exceeds our expectations with respect to what the work presents (the indeterminate or determinate concept or emotion) and how it is presented (the aesthetic idea) only relationally via frustrated attempts at making judgments of perfection. The initial categories, which trigger the process of judging by contradistinguishing the properties of the work, cease to determine our judgment. This indeterminacy allows for free play to take place without interruption. It is free because our imagination is being entertained and is not restricted by our understanding since the category, in getting expanded or discarded, ceases to determine our judgment. What happens in these situations is that our initial attempt at making a judgment of perfection is cancelled out, and, reflecting on the work with free play of cognitive faculties, we evaluate an artwork on the basis of its reception value in the judgment of taste.

IV. EXAMPLES OF KANTIAN CRITICISM

What does the Kantian model of art appreciation tell us? First of all, it tells us that although originality and exemplarity are not directly experienced, they inform our determination of reception value, our judgments of taste. We recognize the originality and exemplarity of a work relationally, through the fact that our initial attempt at making a judgment of perfection is frustrated. These works do not meet our expectations, contrary to what Carroll assumes. Their artistic merit lies in the fact that they are exceeding our expectations and in doing so affording a distinctive type of aesthetic experience to us. In this sense, all the activities Carroll’s critic engages in become part of delineating a common ground of appreciation. If the appreciation process did not proceed as depicted, and we were making a sole judgment of taste, then the critic would not be able to delineate this ground because it would be completely nonconceptual and hence nonarticulable.  However, the Kantian critic has the tools for narrowing down the common ground of appreciation by telling us what the work is not and how the work is not that.

For instance, in her criticism of Ingeborg Bachmann’s (1957, 16) poem “Mortgaged Time,” Karen R. Achberger provides her evaluation of its success value in exceeding our expectations and thereby assists us in the process of discovering its reception value (see Achberger 1995, 12–14). She starts with a classification of the work under post-World War II literature. Through contextualizing the work within this genre and within Bachmann’s oeuvre, she backs up her interpretation of the work, namely, that it presents the post-World War II psyche that is marked by a historical age coming to end and is shaped by the urgency for modern women and men to take action. Achberger traces this poetical imaginary to the attributes used in the poem and elucidates, for instance, how aesthetic attributes of coldness of fish entrails symbolize nearing of an end and how the urgency of the situation is expressed through the aesthetic attributes of running out of time and using mortgaged time that will be due soon. The most crucial part of her criticism comprises her comparison of Bachmann’s “Mortgaged Time” to Bertolt Brecht’s opening poem from the collection Aus dem Lesebuch für Städtebewohner (“Ten Poems from a Reader for Those Who Live in Cities”). Here the category of Brechtian style is evoked not in order to set up the literary context within which “Mortgaged Time” is to be understood, but rather against which its uniqueness is to be appreciated. Achberger cites the instructions given by both poets in the form of imperatives in order to highlight the contra-standard properties of “Mortgaged Time.” She says, “Brecht’s instructions express the experience of general alienation in capitalist society and the need for survival tactics, Bachmann’s, on the other hand, are connected to an irretrievable historical moment and as such are an unmistakable expression of the concrete postwar circumstances” (1995, 14). Achberger further elaborates on Bachmann’s ingenuity in capturing the present moment in contrast to Brecht’s description of a situation after the fact by pointing to her use of adverbs “still,” “no longer,” “already.” She says, “while cold and dark dominate Brecht, Bachmann treats the historical process of becoming cold and dark” (1995, 14).

Furthermore, Achberger uses contextualization to elucidate Bachmann’s aim to capture the present moment by stating that this is a recurring theme in Bachmann’s work and by pointing out the influence of Heidegger and Wittgenstein on her development of this aim. While exploring the originality of Bachmann’s poem through the
use of the category of Brechtian style, Achberger makes us see that indeed Bachmann’s work also exceeds our expectations concerning the category of post-World War II literature and expands this category. We see the critic engaging in several suboperations, such as classification, description, interpretation, contextualization, and elucidation, in order to back up her evaluation of the success value of the work. She appeals to different categories to show how Bachmann’s work exceeds our expectation by using Brechtian style for inspiration and further distinguishing her voice and style from Brecht. In reading Achberger, we become informed about the properties of the work we should pay attention to (the specific words used to animate sensations of end and urgency, the set of aesthetic attributes she uses to establishing various associations, and so on), and this guides our reflection on the aesthetic idea, which is partially constituted by these properties. Furthermore, the critic’s descriptions of these new types of associations also guide us in the process in which our reflection on the aesthetic idea directs us to reflect on the empirical concept it aims to present. As elements of the aesthetic idea that arouse a multitude of sensations and representations, these new associations get added to our concept of the post-World War II psyche and expand it in an unbounded way. If we go through this process in reading the poem and experience this expansion, we experience aesthetic pleasure. Hence, by describing the work’s success value, which is measured in virtue of its success in exceeding expectations, the critic narrows down the common ground of appreciation. However, if the critic fails to develop a novel classification when the work exceeds expectations, the judgment of success value may be mistaken and may mislead a judgment of reception value. Criticism of original and exemplary works involves an attempt at classifying the work, exploring why the work resists this classification, spelling out how and why the work exceeds our expectations, and finally pronouncing the work not merely to be a good example of its kind, but an exceptional art piece. The critic engages in all these activities to aid our appreciation of the work and to make us see why it has the reception value she thinks that it has.

However, not all works exceed our expectation. Here again determination of success value is pivotal in approximating the reception value. Since there are various incorporation or combination judgments that can be used depending on the work itself, one main function of the Kantian art critic is to direct us to make what she or he takes to be the appropriate judgment. The judgment of perfection functions in different capacities, but each time it directly singles out the properties one should pay attention to: sometimes it uncovers different salient features of a work depending on the different categories we subsume the object under, and this directly contributes to our pleasure in the object. Category membership of the work informs our selection of the properties of the work we would reflect on, that is, the constituents of the aesthetic idea expressed by the work and in doing so allows us to form an appreciation that would not otherwise arise. Sometimes it prevents aesthetic engagement from occurring, sometimes it results in an experience of displeasure, sometimes it revokes the aesthetic judgment, and so on. The critic’s job is to highlight the specific role the judgment of perfection plays in what she or he takes to be an appropriate evaluation and to emphasize how it influences the overall aesthetic assessment. In doing so, the critic engages in the typical operations I have been delineating. Again, his or her job is one of classification, spelling out what are the salient features of the work we should pay attention to, and so on. However, this time the critic does all these things in order to explain how the work meets or fails to meet expectations, and thereby she or he manages to restrict the common ground of appreciation.

Acocella’s review of Mozart Dances does exactly what a Kantian critic does in narrowing down the common ground of appreciation. Her descriptions of how Mozart Dances makes abstract movement accessible are prefaced with her claim that Mark Morris does something that his counterparts cannot, and that it is a perfect example of its kind. She starts by informing the readers that when Mozart Dances had its premiere and played for the three consequent nights the tickets were sold out. She tells us that this is also expected on the work itself, one main function of the Kantian art critic is to direct us to make what she or he takes to be the appropriate judgment. The judgment of perfection functions in different capacities, but each time it directly singles out the properties one should pay attention to: sometimes it uncovers different salient features of a work depending on the different categories we subsume the object under, and this directly contributes to our pleasure in the object. Category membership of the work informs our selection of the properties of the work we would reflect on, that is, the constituents of the aesthetic idea expressed by the work and in doing so allows us to form an appreciation that would not otherwise arise. Sometimes it prevents aesthetic engagement from occurring, sometimes it results in an experience of displeasure, sometimes it revokes the aesthetic judgment, and so on. The critic’s job is to highlight the specific role the judgment of perfection plays in what she or he takes to be an appropriate evaluation and to emphasize how it influences the overall aesthetic assessment. In doing so, the critic engages in the typical operations I have been delineating. Again, his or her job is one of classification, spelling out what are the salient features of the work we should pay attention to, and so on. However, this time the critic does all these things in order to explain how the work meets or fails to meet expectations, and thereby she or he manages to restrict the common ground of appreciation.

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Mozart Dances is an intellectual achievement but why it is an aesthetic achievement. In other words, she is trying to explain the inexplicable, namely, the aesthetic pleasure it evokes by narrowing down the common ground of appreciation. That is exactly why we get the following introduction in her review: “Why is he [Mark Morris] so popular? One reason, I think, is that he gives people the modern pleasure of seeing abstract work without leaving them scratching their heads over what it was about” (2007). Then she explains how a story gets formed throughout the work. Acocella’s explanation of the success value of the work directs the audience to understand why it has the reception value it does. To frame it in the Kantian lexicon, she engages in several different suboperations, such as classification, description, interpretation, and so on, which directly support her judgment of perfection. Since this judgment of perfection informs our judgment of taste by being incorporated into it, Acocella’s descriptions of Mozart Dances also directly pick out some of the properties constituting the aesthetic idea expressed by the work, namely, the choreography. She establishes correlations between these properties—the movements of the dancers, the music, the staging, and so on—and the emotions indirectly presented by them and identifies how they contribute to the formation of a narrative. Her interpretation is meant to guide our aesthetic engagement: for instance, she tells us that in the opening scene our reflection on the repetitive sharp movements of the women dancer is going to make us reflect on premonition of trouble. It is important to note that the aesthetic idea is too rich to be exhausted by these descriptions. Reading Acocella, we cannot experience the sequence of emotions that constitutes the narrative informing the work. Such experience is brought about by our reflections on the aesthetic idea expressed by the work. The Kantian art critic can only facilitate our engagement with the work; to experience pleasure one needs to engage with the work itself.

To summarize, this Kantian hybrid account of art criticism incorporates Carroll’s model and puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of artworks with respect to their reception value. On this account reception value is central in critics’ evaluations. One might ask what makes this hybrid account particularist. First, the appropriate judgment of taste is always decided in relation to the particular work itself, and there is no possibility of generalizing from this decision to the success value of other works. Second, even though there are general-enough principles, they can never be principles of taste, and their applicability and usefulness is always decided within the context of engaging with the work itself. Another reason is that, according to Kant, simply reading the critic or imitating the critic does not produce an aesthetic experience of the work. We can defer to the critic’s evaluation of success value but not to his or her evaluation of reception value (see Kant, KU 5:284–285, §33). This is one of the principal tenets of particularism, namely, rejecting the notion that the critic can give a logical proof to persuade the audience of the reception value of a work. The Kantian art critic, in delineating a common ground of appreciation, tells us how to approach the work. The critic provides guidance, but it is up to us to undergo the process of seeing, listening to, or watching the work. Depending on the work, the Kantian art critic engages in several different operations, such as evaluation, classification, description, contextualization, interpretation, analysis, and elucidation, in order to set up a common ground of appreciation. The critic does this with the primary aim of explaining why it makes sense to have the response she or he deems appropriate and, in so doing, aids our appreciation. The obvious merit of this account is that even though it is essentially particularist, it incorporates the sort of judgment that Carroll considers to be central to criticism. Furthermore, through the incorporation of Carroll’s account, we solve the problem of arbitrariness of reasons, namely, the problem concerning how descriptive statements about nonaesthetic properties of artworks can support our aesthetic appraisals without introducing a metaphysically loaded theory of aesthetic properties. The problem is resolved by introducing a mediator between those descriptions and the judgment of taste. The evaluation of success value works as a mediator because it gets direct support from descriptive statements and contributes to the determination of reception value in aesthetic judgments.20

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1. Carroll’s account is amenable to such integration. Even though he does not elaborate on it, he acknowledges that success value of artworks can help to determine their reception value (2009, 62–64). Hence, what I will do in this article is to show how this is possible.

2. I think that this demonstration of general-enough principles cannot be used to overcome the Isenbergian critical dilemma. These general-enough principles establish a connection between nonaesthetic features and good-of-its-kind judgments, not a connection between nonaesthetic features and Isenbergian verdicts, which are reports on the positive or negative aesthetic experiences artworks afford. In this sense, Carroll’s argument does not really help him to overcome the dilemma. Carroll’s account is immune to particularist worries because he changes what ‘verdict’ means: For Carroll, ‘verdict does not refer to an aesthetic judgment but rather to a good-of-its-kind judgment.

3. All references to the Critique of the Power of Judgment in this article will be to volume 5 and page number(s) and section number of the Akademie Ausgabe (Kant 1900–), for example (KU 5.265, §29). Translations will follow Kant (2000). All other references to Kant’s works follow the translations in the Cambridge edition (Kant 1996, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2012) and provide reference to the Akademie Ausgabe by providing the abbreviated title of each work and volume and page number: MS: Metaphysics of Morals, Refl: Notes and Fragments, Anh: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, V-Anth/Fried: Anthropology Friedländer.

4. Kant undercuts aesthetic testimony as a means for developing aesthetic appreciation by claiming that in making judgments of taste the subject is always autonomous. To illustrate this claim he gives his famous example of a young poet:

[A] young poet does not let himself be dissuaded from his conviction that his poem is beautiful by the judgment of the public nor that of his friends, and, if he does give them a hearing, this is not because he
now judges it differently, but rather because, even if (at least in his view) the entire public has a false taste, he nevertheless (even against his judgment) finds cause to accommodate himself to the common delusion in his desire for approval. . . . Taste makes claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgments of others into the determining ground of one’s own would be heteronomy. (KU 5:282, §32)

This does not mean, however, that we cannot form judgments of perfection on the basis of someone’s testimony. Since they are objective empirical judgments, Kantian account does not impose restriction on forming these judgments on the basis of testimony. For an elucidation of how and why Kant permits and even endorses testimony to function as a source of empirical knowledge, see Gelfert (2006).

5. Kant rejects existence of such principles outright. He writes, “By a principle of taste would be understood a fundamental proposition under the condition of which one could subsume the concept of an object and then by means of an inference conclude that it is beautiful. But that is absolutely impossible” (KU 5:285, §34). (See also KU 5:215–216, §§; 5:284–287, §33f.) This is not an unexpected move on Kant’s part. His rejection of general principles of taste is informed by his rejection of rationalist aesthetics. German rationalist aesthetics, which aimed at establishing aesthetics as a science, was a form of generalism. For instance, through his analysis of aesthetic appreciation, Moses Mendelssohn tried to develop general rules, which, he says, “the critic reduces to rational inferences” (1997, 169). By employing these rules, which are based on the general principle or maxim of beauty, the art critics should be able to give reasons for why an artwork is beautiful or not. They establish a logical connection between the critic’s judgment, “object O is beautiful” and the critic’s reason, “because O has such and such unified properties.” Hence, on the basis of these rules the critic makes rational inferences as to why O is beautiful. Mendelssohn, like his rationalist predecessors and contemporaries, thought that it must be possible to imitate the scientific procedure in aesthetics: Just like in science, where in order to demonstrate the validity of a proposition we make inferences from generalizations, in aesthetics we should be able to demonstrate the validity of our aesthetic responses by giving reasons which are backed up by a set of rules. In this sense, when Kant is challenging the possibility of articulating general principles of taste, he is challenging the rationalist account of art criticism according to which one can prove why an artwork is beautiful and thereby make us feel pleasure. This is a very similar motivation to that of Isenberg. Hence, the eighteenth-century debate is near parallel to its twentieth-century counterpart.

6. This is also the reason why a Kantian account of art criticism cannot adopt either of these solutions. Even though Kant’s theory of taste shares the basic theoretical commitments of particularism, both the realist and the antirealist camps present beauty as a property. This move is ruled out by Kant in the Critique of Power of Judgment. For Kant, aesthetic judgment does not consist in subsuming the object under the concept of beauty (KU 5:189, VII; 5:211, §6; 5:218, §9). Instead, he presents a thoroughly expressivist account, according to which the judgment expresses the state of mind one has in reflecting on an object, namely, the free play of cognitive faculties. His expressivism has the advantage of obviating any need for a theory of aesthetic properties. Unfortunately, the combination of his expressivism with his particularism strengthens the impression that any activity engaged in by the Kantian art critic is pointless.

7. Kant himself does not list genres, subgenres, movements, traditions, and so on under the kind concepts we use in judging artworks. However, it is not a far-fetched assumption that his account sanctions them as kind concepts we can employ since (1) they are kind concepts by definition, and (2) Kant explicitly talks about the role of classification of artworks under appropriate kind concepts. For instance, in judging a sculpture we need to realize that this work, insofar as we categorize it under sculpture, expresses ideas through shapes in sensible intuition. A work of architecture does so as well, however, but consideration of how it expresses ideas is secondary to how it fulfills its function. See KU 5:320–326, §51. See also Schaper (1979), and Zuckert (2007, 206–207).

8. Kant gives the following distinction between different types of pleasures in the Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View under the section titled “The feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Division: “1) Sensuous pleasure, 2) intellectual pleasure. The former is either introduced A) through sense (enjoyment), or B) through the power of imagination (taste); the second (that is, intellectual pleasure) is either introduced a) through representable concepts or b) through ideas,—and thus the opposite, displeasure, is also introduced in the same way” (Anth, 7:230). Positive judgment of perfection involves determining an artwork to be good of its kind and evaluating it as an intellectual achievement. This can result in an intellectual enjoyment similar to the enjoyment one takes in sciences (see V-Anth/Fried, 25:572) or one that can come in the form of esteem, approval, or admiration. In this regard we see that there is yet another correlation between Carroll’s and Kant’s accounts. They both think that good-of-its-kind judgments involve assessing intellectual achievements of artworks and lead to developing intellectual satisfaction in contemplating on them. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that, similar to Carroll, Kant neither classifies intellectual pleasure under aesthetic pleasures nor thinks that taste is required to make judgments of perfection.

9. This close correlation can clearly be discerned from the following two definitions Kant gives. “There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) or merely adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it.” (KU 5:229, §16, emphasis added) “[I]f the object is given as a product of art . . . then, since art always presupposes an end in the cause (and its causality), a concept must first be the ground of what the thing is supposed to be, and . . . in the judging of the beauty of art the perfection of the thing will also have to be taken into account” (KU 5:311, §48, emphasis added).

10. Clearly, exceptions must be admitted since Kant classifies few artworks as free beauties: “designs à la grecque, foliage for borders or on wallpaper . . . , fantasias (without a theme). . . . all music without text” (KU 5:229, §16). While allowing these exceptions, it is generally accepted in the secondary literature that most artworks should be treated as adherent beauties. On my view, there are also informed pure judgments of taste, which is in clear contrast with this picture of Kantian theory of artistic beauty. On my reading, most of beautiful art, namely, works of genius, should be...
treated as free beauties. Due to limitations of space, I cannot pursue this additional point in this article.

11. The conjunctive view originates with Gammon (1999), and is adopted and developed by Allison (2001, 290–298), and later furthered by Rueger (2008). The incorporation view, proposed by Zuckert (2007), combines two different lines of interpretation together by assigning two different types of roles to the judgments of perfection. The first one is a negative type of role, as a constraint on aesthetic judging. Here Zuckert follows Guyer’s (1997, 218–220) and Schaper’s (1979) interpretation of adherent beauty. Second is the positive role it plays “as influencing the way in which the properties that render the object perfect are taken up as part of the play of properties in beautiful form” (Zuckert 2007, 204). Note that the conjunctive view and the incorporation view are not incompatible (see Guyer 2002), and there is textual evidence to support both views which present different modes of engaging with both natural and artistic beauty. Since the focus of this article is appropriate appreciation of artistic beauty, I think that there are two main adherent beauty judgments that are apt for this role: the first is Zuckert’s positive incorporation judgment and the second is the conjunctive view’s negative judgment.

12. Indeed, Carroll (2009, 201) acknowledges his debt to Walton’s theory. Zuckert suggests (2007, 206) that Walton’s (1970) distinction between “standard” and “variable” properties could be of help in spelling out the beauty contributing role of judgments of perfection in incorporation judgments. She does not get into much detail but claims that by placing a work under different categories different features become standard and variable, and this tells us what to pay attention to and what to ignore while making a judgment of taste. However, she does not acknowledge that Walton’s account cannot be adopted without making necessary modification and spelling out which aspects of his theory are in clear contrast with Kant’s account. Walton is committed to the view that aesthetic properties are perceptual and that they are in the object (1970, 335). As noted earlier, Kant does not agree that beauty is a perceptual property of an object. I think the best way to accommodate these differences is to use Carroll’s account as the core and make Waltonian additions to it as necessary.

13. Walton claims that non-aesthetic properties of artworks can be grouped under “standard,” “variable,” and “contra-standard” properties. Which non-aesthetic properties of an artwork are standard, variable and contra-standard depends on the category membership of the work in question. A standard property is one in virtue of which a work belongs to a category. A variable property is a property which neither qualifies nor disqualifies the work’s membership in the category. A contra-standard property with respect to category \( x \) is one whose existence tends to disqualify its membership in the category \( x \). Walton argues that there are two responses these types of works can elicit: we can create a new category where the transgressive contra-standard features of the work become standard or expand the relevant category (1970, 352f).

14. Walton (1970) does not produce an argument as to why these properties should be aesthetic other than implicitly claiming that they are instantiated by works of art.

15. See Meagher (2003) and Korsmeyer (2011, 103–105) for analyses of Jenny Saville’s work along these lines.

16. On an important note, even though Kant devotes special attention to the presentation of rational ideas, this should not give the impression that aesthetic ideas cannot present other things and that beautiful art should only have rational ideas as its thematic content. Indeed, aesthetic ideas can present empirical concepts and emotions. For a more detailed elucidation of how such presentation takes place, see Matherne (2013).

17. Kant’s examples of empirical concepts and emotions that can be presented by aesthetic ideas include “furies, diseases, devastations of war, and the like” (KU 5:312, §48) and affects (KU 5:328f, §53). In fact, the only exception seems to be “that which arouses loathing” (KU 5:312, §48).

18. In §51, after claiming that beauty “in general” can be called the expression of aesthetic ideas, Kant says that “only in beautiful art this idea must be occasioned [veranlaßt] by a concept of the object” (KU 5:320, §51, emphasis added). As the wording suggests, our reflection on the aesthetic idea is only occasioned, namely, triggered, by the concept; this does not entail that the concept guides the whole process.

19. This line of thought has been assumed to undercut the possibility of constructing a non-trivial account of Kantian art criticism. See Crawford (1974, 160–171). There, Crawford also claims the best possible function of the Kantian art critic would be to delineate a common ground of appreciation. However, he adds that even though the form of Kantian art criticism is present, it lacks content because this common ground of appreciation is non-articulable due to Kant’s description of the content of aesthetic judgments as nonconceputal.

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